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Socialist! Hatemonger! Can democratic problem-solving
survive in an age of polarization and hyperbole?
Benjamin R. Cole
Lecturer, Center for International Education

T

he proper role of government has been
a subject of significant political debate
throughout U.S. history, but especially
in the last two years since the emergence of the
libertarian Tea Party organization. Nonetheless,
most agree that government has certain core
responsibilities, such as defending citizens’ life and
property, maintaining territorial sovereignty, and
dealing with emergent public policy crises, such as
environmental disasters or epidemics. One of the
most important roles of government, and indeed
one of the motivations for the original creation of
complex governance structures, is the mitigation
and management of social conflict short of violence: complex problem solving.
Different forms of government perform this
conflict-mitigation function, as well as the other
core functions of governance, in different ways.
Autocracies, for example, mitigate social conflict
by minimizing social interaction, while totalitarian states mitigate social conflict by attempting to
exert absolute control over every aspect of social
interaction. Democracies, in contrast, function
by harnessing social interaction. Where autocracies maintain order at the expense of liberty and
free interaction, democracies are designed with an
underlying leap of faith, that people can interact
in politically-significant ways without killing one
another, inciting riots, or otherwise destabilizing society. The democratic strategy is necessarily
more complicated, as it involves striking a delicate
balance between liberty and regulation: people
must be free to interact and communicate, but
this interaction must be structured and regulated;
order must be maintained and safety preserved,
while at the same time the state requires structural
mechanisms (e.g., elections, sub-national governance systems, public question and answer sessions,
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deliberative forums) to translate interaction and
communication in the populace into actionable
information about public policy problems and
preferences. Democracy manages society on the
knife’s edge, balancing between chaos and order,
where a slip in either direction will bring down
anarchy on the one hand and autocratic backsliding on the other.
Democracies, in short, are both complicated
and complex, but they offer a great deal of potential. Research by scholars in the fields of public
administration, economics, and complexity theory
have demonstrated that organizations that harness
social complexity tend to make more informed
decisions and are more adaptable in the face of
change. The last century, at least on the surface,
seems to extend these findings to the performance
of democracies. Leaving aside for a moment the
rise of semi-democratic (anocratic) regimes in
the last thirty years, the twentieth century saw
democratic regimes survive two world wars and
the Cold War, while maintaining extraordinary
economic prowess and continuing to perform
their core functions domestically.
The changes through which our world’s young
democracies persevered is astounding, in retrospect. When my great-grandfather was born,
autocracies were the norm and democracy an
ill-perceived experiment in social engineering, air
travel was a dream (he emigrated from Canada
on horseback), and veterans of the U.S. Civil War
populated small-town parades. By the time of his
death, I had traveled to Japan in twelve hours’
time and watched recorded footage of the moon
landing on the Internet, and democracy had become the government of a majority of the world’s
countries and achieved a monopoly on legitimacy
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in governance. In contrast, how many autocratic
regimes from the 19th century survived the last
century’s tumult?
While it is impossible to foretell how much
similar change we will experience in this century,
so far we are developing quickly indeed – faster
in many cases that societal norms have been able
to catch up. Internet and cellular phone usage are
ubiquitous, with the former now readily accessed
via the latter. The media is struggling to transition
into the new digital world, and the mainstream
television news broadcast has been replaced by
news entertainment. Instant messaging and email
have replaced the written letter, and students increasingly seem more comfortable communicating
online than in person. I recently invited several
students to dinner, only to find them checking Facebook notifications during the awkward
pauses endemic to polite conversation. Perhaps
not surprisingly, our attention span has reduced
in this new digital age, and where politicians once
gave speeches for hours on end, including lengthy,
well-reasoned arguments, in the modern era the
thirty-second sound-bite, loaded with hyperbole
and rhetoric, rules the political domain. At the
same time, we find that Americans are becoming
less informed and more polarized.
Unfortunately for government, technology is
only one aspect in which the world is becoming
more complex. We face enormous problems in the
next century, with looming crises due to energy
consumption and fossil fuel dependence, climate change, deforestation, water pollution, and
desertification, among others. We are increasingly
dependent upon highly complex technology for
our economic and military strength, and massive,
grid-debilitating solar flares are expected in the
next decade. The number of independent states
in the world has more than quadrupled in the last
seventy years. Governments face the same core
responsibilities as ever, but they do so in an environment characterized by extreme and increasing
levels of complexity, interconnectivity, and inter-

dependence.
Few would argue that the last one hundred years
have seen more change, more quickly, than any
other period in human history. While democracies
are better situated to adapt to changing environmental conditions, they can only do so if their
structures and institutions remain flexible. Can
our democracy survive the modern age? More specifically, can democratic institutions continue to
help us solve our increasingly complex problems
in this age of hyperbole, polarization, and the
decreased attention span?
While on the surface these problems may seem
minor compared to the crises looming on the
horizon, the first two are particularly worrisome
for governance. Factionalism, the systemic polarization of society into haves and have-nots,
for- and anti-system groups, decried by James
Madison in Federalist 51, has been identified and
confirmed as a leading cause of democratic breakdown and civil war by the U.S. Political Instability Task Force. Most of the young democracies
in the world will die before age 15, in no small
part because of the identity politics associated
with factionalism. Polarization is dangerous to
democracies, but the replacement of reasoning
by rhetoric and truth by hyperbole endangers
them even further, because it reduces potentiallyconstructive disagreement into destructive antisystem goals and language. Like the fairies of Peter
Pan, when the people lose faith in the system, the
system begins to die. The U.S. reached this state
of factionalism in the 1850s and 1860s, leading to
the ruinous Civil War. We came close again in the
1960s, when identity politics and polarization led
to significant violence between state and citizenry.
Belgium has recently suffered from this transition
from policy to identity-based politics, having had
no effective government for the last few years due
to the failure of its increasingly polarized political
parties to reach agreement. The survival of our system through both the Civil War and the twentieth
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century speak to the resilience of our institutions.
Continued survival, however, will depend on continued flexibility in the face of change, flexibility
that is undermined by polarization and hyperbole,
alignment of policy preferences with identity.
When liberals become communists and conservatives become fascists, the flexibility of the political
system is eroded.
Professor Richman’s position paper inspires
another question: what happens to democratic
problem-solving when participants no longer
agree on the nature of truth, or when leaders use
lies to advance parochial political agendas? Recently, bold-faced lies have become common in
our political discourse: Senator Kyl’s “not intended to be a factual statement” memo is a high-profile example. Democratic deliberation is founded
on the basis of truth – when hyperbole and lies
replace evidence and truth as the basis of our discussion, we make worse policy rather than better
policy; instead of harnessing social complexity, we
threaten to unleash the mob.
In order to continue to mitigate social conflict
and solve our increasingly complex problems, we
must seek to make our political system, including both structures and participation dynamics,
more flexible and adaptable, and resist the structural inertia that bureaucracies develop over time.
The question facing us is how to develop such
flexibility. How does the use of referenda affect
the problem-solving capacity of government? If
the growing federal government is a sign of such
inertia, could greater devolution of power to local
and regional governments improve flexibility?
Other states, such as Canada or the United Kingdom, are more decentralized than the U.S., and
seem to do fine. Could a deliberative democratic
structure serve our needs better? In that case, who
decides which topics and pieces of evidence can be
brought to the deliberation table?
Democracy is no more effective or flexible than
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the institutions that comprise it, and it can last
no longer than does the faith of its citizens. While
democracies are more flexible than autocracies due
to their strategy of harnessing social complexity;
inertia, polarization, and hyperbole threaten to
erode our political institutions and our faith in the
democratic experiment. Can democratic problemsolving survive the modern era?

